The political economy of India's economic growth is an issue of abiding interest. Higher and sustained economic growth has, all over the world, been the surest and most time tested means of raising living standards and reducing poverty. Further, given that it is a functioning democracy, economic policy in India can often be dictated by political expediency as political parties indulge in competitive populism in the face of improvements in social indicators such as literacy, infant mortality and the like lagging behind rises in the rate of economic growth. Thus the political economy of policy formulation is an important area of concern. Finally, an analysis of what policies can be undertaken given these constraints is an important indicator of potential welfare implications of policies for such a large section of humanity.
I. Introduction
The political economy of India's economic growth is an issue of abiding interest. Higher and sustained economic growth has, all over the world, been the surest and most time tested means of raising living standards and reducing poverty. Further, given that it is a functioning democracy, economic policy in India can often be dictated by political expediency as political parties indulge in competitive populism in the face of improvements in social indicators such as literacy, infant mortality and the like lagging behind rises in the rate of economic growth.
Thus the political economy of policy formulation is an important area of concern. Finally, an analysis of what policies can be undertaken given these constraints is an important indicator of potential welfare implications of policies for such a large section of humanity.
Several recent reviews of India's recent growth experience exist (Rodrik and Subrahmanian, 2004 , Kelkar, 2004 , and Thirlwell, 2004 are three examples). The value added of the present paper is to place India's growth experience within a broader political economy perspective. It documents the broad contours of economic growth in India (section II); then analyzes the emerging obstacles to higher economic growth (section III) and finally the prospects for accelerating the economic reforms program to place India on a sustained higher economic growth path (section IV). Section V concludes.
II. The Record of Economic Growth in India
The record of economic growth (annual rate of growth of real GNP) in independent India has been uneven. Until about 1980 growth rates were low and subject to considerable volatility. This record has improved since then. In Table 1 we depict salient characteristics of aggregate economic growth in India. Assessment of performance according to a broader criteria such as human development indicators is important for at least two reasons -first, these figures indicate whether economic growth, as such, has been impacting upon the poor. Second, the poor progress in areas other than GDP (but which are of considerable significance to the population at large) might risk loss of popular support for the policies that made high GDP growth possible in the first place. This, as argued later in the chapter, might then appear as a constraint on attaining high growth rates.
What is the sectoral distribution of India's economic growth? Table 2 2 The share of agriculture in employment is, however, much higher. One of the current important anomalies in the Indian economy is that a sector that produces 25 percent of GDP employs 65 precent of the labour force.
lower base in 2001-02. Similar comments hold for mining. Growth in electricity production has been slow -perhaps reflecting the poor state of electricity generation and, particularly, transmission and distribution in India. The highest growth sector has been services. Growth in this sector has occurred across a broad range and has been the most stable of all sectoral growth rates. As a consequence, the share of services in GDP has gone up substantially. The evolution over time of the sectoral composition of Indian GDP is portrayed in Figure 1 . The higher GDP growth rate beginning in the 1980s has been accompanied by an even sharper acceleration in total factor productivity growth. Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) examine a number of possible explanations for this rise in productivity/growth. Such explanations include Keynesian type demand-led expansion in the 1980s, the advent of the Green Revolution, and possible external and internal liberalization. However, they find empirical support for attitudinal changes in the governments of Indira and later, Rajiv
Gandhi. These administrations, it is argued, began viewing private investment and enterprise more favorably. This had salutary effects on manufacturing sector productivity and later had substantial spillover effects. Such beneficial synergies were helped by the climate of deregulation and delicensing started in the early 1990s. Other authors have placed a much stronger emphasis on the role of the post 1991 reforms and downplayed the role of policy initiatives of the 1980s. 3 To be sure, financial sector reforms began only in 1993 and are yet to be completed. 3 There has been a debate of sorts about whether attitudinal changes in the government bureaucracy or actual policy changes are better explanations for the acceleration in economic growth in India. In a country with an autarkic trade regime and a highly centralized administrative structure, attitudinal changes may well be the hardest to make. Hence, both policy measures as well as attitudinal changes should be regarded as essential as well as complementary explanations for this surge in the rate of growth. 4 For a review of financial sector reforms in India see Sharma (2004) .
The current high rate of economic growth could well accelerate further as Kelkar (2004) has opined. Contributing to this acceleration is a broad series of reforms including financial sector reforms, increased globalization and widening and deepening of product and financial markets. The impact of such reforms gets reflected in key indicators such as market capitalization of the stock market, the technology and transparency of transactions, the sets of instruments traded, balance sheets of financial institutions and the degree of openness of the economy. At the same time a benign FDI policy framework has permitted greater tie-ups in high technology areas for production for domestic as well as external markets.
Adding to the impetus for higher economic growth are certain structural changes occurring in the Indian economy -particularly on the supply side. In 2000 the proportion of the Indian population in the working age group (15-64 age bracket) was 60.9%. The UN's Population Division has projected that this ratio will surpass the proportion of Japanese in this age group by 2012 and climb to over 66% in 30 years. At that point in time it is poised to overtake
China's population in the same age group. This is a very significant projection.
At the same time a quiet revolution is taking place in nutritional status in India. Table 3 (based on the author's computations) reports on the proportion of the rural population in India that is nutritionally deprived. This assessment is based on the assumption that all persons are working (alternately) according to three work norms -sedentary, moderate and heavy. These three norms imply different minimum calorific requirements with the "sedentary" norm being the lowest and the "heavy" norm being the highest. Results are reported for three time periods -1987-88, 1993-94 and 1999-2000 th Round (1999-00) . "Sedentary" norm is defined as 2400 calories per day per adult male, 1900 per adult female and 1300 per child. "Moderate" norm is defined as 2800 calories per adult male, 2200 per adult female and 1300 per child. "Heavy" work norm is defined as 3900 per adult male, 3000 per adult female and 1300 per child.
Clearly India's labour force is undergoing rapid structural transformation: the proportion of the working population is rising; the labour force is less nutritionally deprived and increasingly literate. These changes imply substantial quality improvements in the Indian labour force. Economic theory and international experience leads us to believe that this will lead to sharp rises in labour productivity and an upward shift in the trend long run rate of growth of the Indian economy.
III. Emerging Constraints on Rapid Economic Growth in India
Having analyzed the prospects for rapid economic growth in India it behooves us to examine some emerging constraints. Evolution of the Indian economy according to the sanguine aggregate picture sketched above is subject to how these constraints to rapid economic growth in India work themselves out. We classify these constraints in four categories: (i) increasing spatial inequality; (ii) stagnating employment; (iii) high fiscal deficit; and (iv) inadequate growth of infrastructure. These constraints often reinforce each otherparticularly through the democratic political process. I now discuss these in turn.
i) Increasing regional inequality
The aggregate economic growth narrative presented above masks substantial spatial variations. The regional variation in economic growth in India has remained stubbornly high despite the reforms. Table 4 presents mean growth rates and standard deviation for fifteen major states of India. In almost every year the mean growth rate has been lower than the (spatial) standard deviation of these growth rates, indicating persistently high spatial variability. As a consequence per capita incomes show a tendency to diverge across Indian states. Figure 2 plots the intertemporal behaviour of the coefficient of variation of per capita incomes across fifteen major Indian states. This shows an upward trend, further underscoring the divergence of incomes across space. This increasing divergence across the states gets reflected in other critical areas as well, e.g.
the regional incidence of poverty, particularly rural poverty. Figure 3 shows that economic reforms have been accompanied by a rising coefficient of variation (across fifteen major Indian states) of the head count ratio of poverty. This coefficient of variation has had a distinct upward trend -particularly in the 1990s. 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Source: Jha (2001) Jha (2001) shows that there is lack of convergence (in a formal statistical sense) in the incidence of rural poverty across Indian states both in terms of their ranks with respect to poverty as well as in terms of their levels of poverty. In fact in respect of the critical magnitudes of poverty, mean consumption and inequality of consumption, economic reforms do not seem to have made much difference to the inequality across Indian states for any category except urban mean consumption. This lack of convergence extends itself to the level of NSS agro-climatic zones (NSS regions) 6 as point out.
This rising regional inequality is now a matter of concern. Reducing interstate disparities has The lower panel of Table 5 we present results using this criterion in this chapter. Table 6 provides details on employment and unemployment in India in recent times. The data in Table 6 originate from labour market studies of the National Sample Survey.
There appears to have been a sharp decline in the rate of employment growth in the 1990s.
This decline has been associated with a comparatively higher rate of growth of GDP, indicating a decline in the labour intensity of production. Further, the data reveal that the decline in the rate of growth of employment was associated with a sharp decline in the rate of growth of the labour force. Both the absolute number of unemployed as well as the incidence of unemployment (expressed in terms of unemployed as a percentage of the labour force) increased during this period.
To discover the underpinnings of the drop in the growth of employment we examine the sectoral composition of employment growth. This is reported in Table 7 . The decline in the overall growth rate of employment in 1994-2000 was largely attributable to two factors: a near stagnation of employment in agriculture and a slowdown in public sector employment. The share of agriculture in total employment dropped substantially from 60 per cent in 1993-94 to 57 percent in 1999-2000. On the other hand, employment growth in all the sub-sectors within services (except community, social and personal services having negative growth rates) exceeded 5 per cent per annum. As has been the trend in the past, the share of casual labour in total employment has gone up.
Only a small percentage (8 to 9 percent) of the total workforce of the country is employed in the organized sector. While employment growth in the private organized sector improved significantly in the 1990s, the growth in employment in the public sector was negligible.
Since the public sector accounts for more than two thirds of the total organized sector employment, there was a substantial slow down of the overall growth in organized sector employment.
The Ninth Five Year Plan of the Government of India projected a decline in the population growth rate to 1.59 per cent per annum by the end of the Ninth Plan, from over 2 per cent in the previous three decades. However, it expected the growth rate of the labour force to reach a peak level of 2.54 per cent per annum over this period; the highest it has ever been and is ever likely to attain. This is because of the change in age structure, with the highest growth occurring in the 15-19 years age group in the Ninth Plan period.
The Ninth Plan expected an additional 53 millions to join the labour force on the "usual not been fulfilled. The economy grew at a rate slower than 7 percent and agricultural investment was sluggish. In addition, there was at least one year of poor agricultural growth. These factors combined to ensure that employment did not grow as anticipated in the Ninth Plan.
In addition to open unemployment there also exists India's persistent problem of underemployment. Underemployment in various segments of the labour force is quite high. The estimates of the 50 th Round of the NSS indicate that although open unemployment was only taken together was as much as 10 per cent that year. This occurred despite the fact that the incidence of underemployment was reduced substantially in the decade ending 1993-94.
The higher unemployment creates a political climate in which policy measures such as increased liberalization of international trade become increasingly difficult to take since such policies may be construed to involve short-term increases in unemployment or, at the least, increase the perceived uncertainty of tenure of employment. In fact since liberalization policies might entail greater vulnerability to external risk, there might well be pressures for governments to increase employment in the public sector (Rodrik, 1998) . This might well bloat up the size of an inefficient public sector and reduce the effectiveness of any economic reforms program.
(iii) High Fiscal Deficit
India's fiscal deficit woes have been well documented (see, for instance, Jha, Chand and
Sharma (2003)). The combined fiscal deficit of the central and state governments has been hovering near 10 percent of GDP for quite some time now. Some details are provided in As a result the public debt of India has been climbing steadily and is currently reported at about 85 percent of GDP. There has been a change in the composition of this debt, however, with the share of external debt falling and that of internal debt rising.
This persistently high fiscal deficit has had deleterious effects. It has reduced the amount of resources available for investment by lowering public saving. The saving rate in India at 23.1 percent of GDP is lower than the levels needed to sustain growth rates of 8 percent and above for long. In addition, public dissaving because of the high fiscal deficit is reducing the resources available for investment (Saggar, 2003) . Since 1998-99 the public sector has been dissaving continuously. Furthermore, some of the savings-investment gap spills over onto the external balance. In addition, persistent pre-occupation with controlling the fiscal deficit reduces the flexibility to conduct countercyclical fiscal policy.
Budgetary deficits -directly measured -are only part of the fiscal burden of the state in India. It is well-known that contingent liabilities of the government are very large. In the past the government has had to bail out insolvent banks and other financial institutions (the latest being the Unit Trust of India) at severe cost (Sharma, 2004) .
(iv) Problems of Infrastructure
India's record in providing high quality, reliable and reasonably priced infrastructural services to its households and businesses has been inadequate. The World Economic Forum's 1998 Global Competitiveness Report ranked India last among 53 countries on the quality of overall infrastructure services. 8 Indian households and businesses still receive infrastructure services largely through the public sector -often through government departmental undertakings. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that this state of affairs will continue for some time. Even though the potential of the private sector to meet India's pressing infrastructure needs is largely untapped, and hence can be expanded considerably, there will continue to be a major role for the public sector in providing infrastructural services, However, before such investment can take place, the paucity of infrastructural facilities hampers rapid economic growth. Jha and Thapa (2003) 
IV. Prospects for alleviating the constraints on rapid economic growth
That rapid economic liberalization of the form that took place in China beginning in the late 1970s is difficult to achieve in India is now clear. In a democratic society tolerance for rapidly increasing inequality and slow realization of gains of liberalization for the poor is low. For instance, India will not be able to countenance the vast regional inequality that has emerged in China between the coastal areas and the interior. Hence, relieving the constraints on building consensus for rapid liberalization is an essential part of the strategy to sustain rapid economic growth in India.
How likely is this? Although there exists room for reorienting subsidies it is difficult to see how their total magnitude can be reduced significantly. Some expenditures are highly inflexible and three such items (interest payments, defence expenditure and subsidies) make up almost 100 percent of tax revenues. India's expenditure/GDP ratio is not much out of line for developing countries and is substantially below that of OECD countries.
However, there is much to be gained from tax reform and substantial opportunity exists for raising the tax/GDP ratio. This ratio has been stagnant for some time now and is substantially below that of OECD and even some developing countries. Jha, Chand and Sharma (2003) discuss the contours of a tax reform program to raise the tax/GDP ratio. This involves expanding the tax net by removing exemptions and taxing services as well as agricultural income, consolidating and rationalizing indirect taxes into a value added tax and improving tax administration.
Such tax reform and lowering the fiscal deficit becomes even more necessary because of the extent of contingent liabilities of the government. These include but are not confined to the non-performing assets of banks.
Taking efforts to increase the employment elasticity of income growth is another important challenge facing Indian policymakers. Rapid rise in agricultural employment must await substantial investment -particularly in agricultural infrastructure. Employment growth in the services sector has been impressive but the capacity of this sector to absorb labour is limited.
For purposes of employment expansion India will have to rediscover its latent comparative advantage in low value added manufacturing. This has been the area of most rapid growth in China and several Southeast Asian countries. India did not enter this club and imposed high tariffs on these products while at the same time producing these product domestically in "small scale industries", many of which were granted reservations for producing specific goods. The result has been high cost production which is non-competitive both in the domestic and international markets.
A more enlightened policy would be to remove the reservations for the small scale industrial sectors as well as reducing tariffs. Labour market regulations can be made more flexible.
After decades of high GDP growth China and Southeast Asia have moved up the value chain in manufacturing production and India could well occupy the vacated low value added manufacturing space. Indeed India could become one of the most important production centres in these areas. This also has the potential to create large increases in employment. The functioning of ports has also recorded some improvements -partly as a result of contracting out the operations of ports to international firms with specialised expertise on this subject. According to Kelkar (2004) the turnaround time at ports dropped by half, from 7.5 days in 1996-97 to 3.5 days in 2001-02. Airport privatisation has however suffered a setback after the 2004 elections as has the whole process of privatisation, per se.
Thus the prospects for effective alleviation of the constraints facing higher economic growth are mixed. However, just in order to ensure adequate employment opportunities, India needs real GDP growth of about 7 percent per annum. It remains to be seen whether a forward looking economic reforms program able to work around some of these constraints and ensure high and stable growth can be put in place.
V. Conclusions
After two decades of economic reforms the Indian economy is at a crossroads. The reforms program has yielded considerable returns in the form of higher and more stable growth as well as considerable modernization of the economy. After more than two decades of impressive economic growth and some important reforms as well as deregulation, the Indian economy is at the threshold of even higher growth.
However, unforeseen and stubborn challenges have been thrown up especially in the areas of the high fiscal deficit and financial sector weakness, increasing regional and personal inequality, low elasticity of employment with respect to growth and inadequate infrastructure.
Several of these, e.g., inadequate decline in poverty are such that they can be addressed best by high and sustained economic growth. However, these might act as short-term constraints on economic reforms especially when they play themselves out through the democratic process. This is an important challenge for policymaking in India.
The Indian economy is currently showing considerable promise in terms of growth performance. However, success in attaining high and sustained rates of economic growth is not automatically guaranteed.
